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BATTALION/TASK FORCE S2 SECTION

APPENDIX D

BRIGADE OPERATIONS ORDER 99-01

PREFACE

These generic division and brigade Operations Orders are provided to assist the S2 section in training the initial portions of intelligence staff work such as IPB, RISTA Planning, etc. The S2 section can train by playing the role of the staff section in any of the task forces in the 2nd Brigade.

The S2 can substitute these orders with ones maintained in the unit from past exercises for their local training area, CMTC, JRTC or NTC. The S2 section can train their collective tasks either alone or in conjunction with other staff elements during a unit STAFFEX.

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COPY No___ OF ___COPIES
2ND BDE / 4TH INF DIV (MECH)
Sonora
1999
MRN#

OPERATIONS ORDER 99-01

Reference: Maps, series, 1:25,000 Series 1501, Sheet NI 12-11 & 12-12 & 12-3, 1:50,000, Series V798, Sheet 3846 I, 3946 I & IV, 3947 I, II, III & IV

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan:

Task Organization:

2ND BDE

1-10 INF (MECH)
1-12 INF (MECH)
3-68 AR
A/1-44 ATKHB (OPCON)
3-29 FA (155, SP) (DS)
A/4-61 ADA (GS)
4TH ENG BN
A/104TH MI BN
1/(DECON)/ 4TH CML CO
1/984TH MP CO
1ST FSB

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces:

(1) Elements of the 16th Maricopian Combined Arms Army (CAA) are presently in assembly areas to the east of the Sonora-Maricopia Border. There are indications that this activity is a cover for an invasion of Sonora. The 4th ID (M) is directly opposed by two Maricopian Mechanized divisions will be attrited by the Sonarian 5th Mechanized Brigade. This force could attack the 4th ID (M) sector within 48 to 72 hours. As part of the 16th CAA's scheme of maneuver, Maricopian forces will conduct a supporting attack into 1st BDE 4th ID (M) sector in the Sulphur Springs Valley (XL2010) toward the Fort Huachuca/ Libby Air Field complex. The main attack will be conducted in 2nd BDE 4th ID (M) to seize key terrain. There will be Level I and II threats in the division's rear area with high priority targets being C2 nodes, logistical supply points and main supply routes (MSRs). The enemy will conduct aggressive

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reconnaissance to identify our defensive positions. The 16th CAA will continue to attack with three mechanized brigades in the first echelon. Lead echelon brigades will attack with two battalions in the lead brigade echelon and one battalion in the second brigade echelon. Divisional second echelon forces can reinforce the attack in four to six hours with a second echelon division in twelve to eighteen hours.

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) 4th ID (Mech) defends in sector NLT 99 to defeat first echelon divisions of the 16th CAA to retain the Green Valley (VA 0125) oil fields and uranium mines. O/O prepare to conduct offensive operations to restore the FEBA, reconstitute and prepare for future operations.

(2) Division Commander's Intent: I intend to retain the Green Valley oil fields and uranium mines area by deploying combat forces in the Fort Huachuca/ Libby Air Field complex.. We will accomplish this by conducting an area defense to defeat the enemy and focus on: the international border to allow no penetration of PL Sun greater than a MRC. Our defense will focus on aggressive security operations to destroy division/brigade/ battalion recon and forward detachments; close operations to destroy lead echelon brigades of the MRDs combined with simultaneous deep operations to defeat second echelon brigades in EAs and At the conclusion of this operation, the first echelon divisions (?) of the 16th CAA will be defeated, and the follow-on division will assume a hasty defense east of the international border. Our division will restore the FEBA, reconstitutes, and prepares for future operations.

(3) 1st Brigade defends in sector from WK 8479 to WK 7801 NLT 99 to defeat enemy forces west of PL Moon to retain the western avenues of approaches to the Fort Huachuca/ Libby Air Field complex.

(5) 4th Aviation Brigade occupies TAA LAAF. O/O, attacks along AXIS and to destroy enemy second echelon regiments in EA. O/O, support local counterattacks to restore the FEBA.

(6) 1-10 Cav screens the division front NLT 99 between PL Planet and PL Moon to destroy enemy divisional and brigade reconnaissance forces. O/O, conduct a rearward passage of lines with 2nd Bde and revert to 4th Avn Bde control. PL Moon is the BHOL.

c. Attachments and Detachments: Annex A (Task Organization) effective upon receipt.

(1) The Sonoran 10th and 12th Brigades, 1st Mechanized Division will defend to the brigade's northern boundary astride Highway 10.

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(2) The Sonoran 5th Brigade, 1st Mechanized Division will defend south of the 1st Brigade, 4th ID (M)'s sector in the Sulphur Springs Valley and defend the gaps in the Mule-Dragoon Mountains passes.

d. Assumptions: TBP

2. MISSION. 2nd Bde / 4th ID (M) defends in sector WL 7802 to WL 7417 NLT 99, defeating enemy forces west of PL Moon to retain the western avenues of approaches to the Green Valley oil fields and uranium mines. O/O prepare to conduct offensive operations to restore the FEBA, reconstitute and prepare for future operations.

3. EXECUTION.

Commander's Intent: I intend to destroy the 30th MID east of PL Moon and allow no penetrations of the PL Star greater than an motorized rifle company to retain the western avenues of approach to the Green Valley oil fields and uranium mines complex. We will accomplish this by conducting an area defense that focuses on aggressive security operations between PL Moon and PL Star to destroy division/brigade reconnaissance elements and forward detachments. The Tombstone and Mustang Mountains regions presents to the enemy some severely restricted obstacles that will influence the enemy forces south into the Brigade's area of operation. The Brigade will destroy the lead echelon brigades of the MID in EA (?) through the effective application of maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership. The Brigade's deep operations, A/1-44 ATKBN, will defeat second echelon battalions of the first echelon regiments in EAs Murder, Kill and Dead. O/O, 3-68 AR(-) (Brigade reserve) will commit along AXIS (?) to conduct a counterattack to destroy enemy forces in EA (?) and to gain the initiative. Success is measured by the destruction of the 30th MID/16th CAA and denied penetration of PL Star greater than an motorized rifle company. The Brigade then restores the FEBA, reconstitutes, and prepares for future operations.

a. Concept of operations. Annex C (Operations Overlay).

Phase One (Counter-reconnaissance)

1-10 CAV conduct a rearward passage of lines with TF 3-68. PL Moon is BHOL.

TF 3-68AR (-) screens the Bde front between PL Moon and PL Star to destroy enemy divisional and brigade recon forces.

TF 3-68 AR (-) attrits the advance guard.

O/O TF 3-68 AR (-) conducts a rearward passage of lines with TF 1-12 INF and TF 3-68 becomes the Bde counterattack force into EA Rock.

Phase Two (Main Battle)

TF 1-10 defends in sector to destroy the lead echelon battalion of the first echelon brigades. TF 1-10 turns remaining enemy elements towards TF-12 sector.

O/O TF 1-10 repositions elements to BP1 to destroy enemy forces from the flank in EA Nova.

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TF 1-12, the Bde's main effort, defends in the southern Bde sector to destroy lead echelon BNs of the enemy's first echelon Brigades of the 30th MID. Delay and disrupt remaining elements of the lead echelon regiments within the restricted passes prior to entering EA Nova.
Phase Three (Commitment of Counterattack Force)

A/1-44th ATKHB commits along Axis Bird to initiate counterattack in EA Rock. O/O, TF 3-68(-) commits along Axis Warp to conduct a counterattack to destroy enemy forces in EA Rock.. The Bde restores the FEBA at PL and prepares for future operations.

(2) Fires:

(a) Brigade Commander's Intent For Fire Support: Provide preplanned SEAD fires to neutralize or destroy enemy air defense systems to facilitate 1-44 AHB deep attacks. Mass fires in pre-planned EA from PL Planet to PL Comet to assist in the destruction of first echelon brigades. Maximize the use of FASCAM to reinforce planned obstacles to delay disrupt rapid movements into TF engagement areas. Target and destroy attack enemy artillery and mortars to protect friendly operations. In all phases limit the use of COPPERHEAD to High Pay-Off Targets.

(b) Priority of fires: 3-68 AR (-) , TF 1-12 INF , TF 1-10 INF in order. Upon rearward passage of 3-68 AR (-), priority shifts to TF 1-12 INF, TF 1-10 INF, 3-68 AR in order. Priority shifts to 3-68 AR (Brigade Reserve) and 1-44 AHB when committed.

(c) Counterfire Priorities: Brigade artillery groups, jammers and FACP/OPs.

(d) Priority of effort for GS fires: Counterbattery, SEAD, and interdiction. Priority of effort for GS fires will shift to SEAD upon commitment of 1-44 AHB.

(e) Field Artillery Support: 3-29 FA provides conventional artillery fires to support the Brigade's defense in sector to destroy enemy forces forward of PL to retain the western avenues of approaches to the Fort Huachuca/ Libby Airfield complex.

(3) Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance forward of PL Star to identify and locate recon elements and the advance guard of the 30th MID and identify the enemy's main effort.

(4) Intelligence. A/104th MI priority of ground surveillance support initially to 3-68 AR (-), then O/O to TF 1-12 IN. HUMINT priority is to force protection in the brigade rear area.

b. Tasks to Maneuver Units.

(1) TF 1-10 INF

(a) Defend in sector from WL 7405 to WL 7802 NLT 99 to defeat enemy forces west of PL Moon to retain the western approaches to the Green Valley oil fields and uranium mines

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(b) Block enemy penetrations of the TF sector and influence remaining first echelon brigades elements to maneuver south into the main effort (TF 1-12 INF).

(d) O/O, position TF elements move into BP1 to destroy enemy forces from the flank in EA .

(2) TF 1-12 INF (Bde main effort)

(a) Defend in battle position WK to WL NLT 99 to destroy the main attack of the first echelon brigades of the 30th MID in EA .

(b) O/O pass 3-68 AR (-) rearward (NET 99).

(c) Influence enemy second echelon forces into BP(?) for commitment of 3-68 AR (-)

(4) 3-68 AR

(a) 3-68 AR (-) screen the Brigade front between PL Moon and PL Star NLT 99 between PL Moon and PL to destroy enemy divisional and brigade recon forces.

(b) 3-68 AR (-) delay and attrit to 60% of the forward detachments or advanced guards, to deny information on friendly defenses.

(c) O/O 3-68 AR (-) conduct a rearward passage of lines with and TF 1-12 INF and positioned in TAA to prepare for phase III (the brigade counterattack force) .

(d) O/O, commit along axis to conduct a spoiling attack to destroy enemy forces in EA .

(e) Deny penetrations of PL Star greater than a motorized rifle company and prepare for future operations.

(5) 1-44 ATKHB

(a) Occupy TAA (grid) and become OPCON to the brigade during Phase II.

(b) O/O attack along AXIS to destroy enemy BAGs and second echelon battalions of the first echelon brigades in EAs.

(c) O/O support local counterattacks to restore the FEBA.

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(.d) 2nd Brigade is allocated 16 CAS sorties for planning purposes. Priority of CAS is to the Brigade main effort. Battalion/Task Force air requests and BAI nominations will be forwarded to the Brigade TAC NLT 1200 hours daily.

c. Tasks to Combat Support Units.

(1) Intelligence: A/104 MI: (See Annex B). A / 104th MI provides EW support to the Brigade's defensive mission. Priority of support to 3-68 AR (-) when screening the Brigade front. Priority of effort for organic collection is to locating and tracking, in order, reconnaissance elements, advanced guards, fire support units, maneuver units and brigade and battalion command posts and brigade artillery FDC nets. Conduct collection, intercept and DF missions in support of the Brigade's defensive mission. Protect friendly C2 electronics systems. Priority is to identify and monitor C3I nets. Prior to enemy contact, jamming will not be conducted. After enemy contact with 3-68 AR (-) (by direct or indirect fire), priority of jamming is to battalion and brigade command and control nets. Prior to 1-44 ATKHB deep attacks target regimental ADA nets, second echelon battalion C2 nets When 1-44 ATKHB is committed, jamming priority shifts to enemy ADA radars and command and control nets in support of SEAD

(2) Combat Engineer Support.: 4 ENG BN supports combat operations of the Brigade's defense in sector to destroy enemy forces forward of PL to retain the western avenues of approaches to the Fort Huachuca/ Libby Airfield complex. Priority of unit support is TF1-12 INF, TF 1-10 INF to fortify and to block attacking forces in the sector and influence them into the main battle area, 3-68 AR (-) when screening, and the Brigade Reserve: Priority of effort in the defense is to countermobility, survivability, and mobility. Priority of effort in the offense is mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The Brigade has been allocated four, low density, short duration, FASCAM for planning purposes. Division retains release authority for FASCAM.

(3) Air Defense:Counterair operations: ADA warning status: YELLOW; weapons control status: TIGHT. Priority of protection is to the maneuver forces, field artillery systems, Brigade trains and C2 facilities A / 4-61 ADA provides air defense protection to the Brigade with weighted coverage forward in support of the maneuver and artillery forces. Hostile ID and ROE criteria: Attacking friendly troops of a defended asset; having markings and/or visually identified by a qualified observer as hostile. Target must be violating airspace control measures (ACMs) and have an invalid or no-response (IFF). The Standard Airspace Control Order with approved airspace control measures is published at 2000 hours daily and is effective at 0001 hours the following day.

(4) Signal: 3/B/24 SIG provides electronic protection and signal security and assists Brigade tactical deception operations.

(5) NBC: 1/4 CML CO will establish locations for deliberate decon sites in the Brigade sector, provides NBC recon assets to maintain maneuver and provides NBC surveillance

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and defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of the Brigade. Decontamination will take place as soon as possible and as far forward as possible as. Priority is to ground maneuver units, artillery units, aviation units, CS and CSS units in order.

(6) Military Police. 1/ 984th MP conducts civil-military operations (CMO) to support the Brigade's defense of the Fort Huachuca/Libby Airfield complex avenues of approach. Provide battlefield circulation control and rear area security missions with an emphasis on supply route protection.

(7) Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Refer to Annex R

(8) Civil-Military Operations: Refer to Annex U

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) PIR. (See Annex B)

(2) Anti-terrorism Actions: Civilians will not be allowed into unit areas. Refugees are the responsibility of Sonarian authorities; therefore report and release to civil authorities as soon as possible.

(3) MOPP II 99. Units will implement individual and unit NBC measures to minimize the effects of enemy NBC attacks. Report battalion / Task Force-level changes to the Brigade TAC.

(4) Limit of advance for forward recon / security elements is PL Comet.

(5) 3-68 AR (-) coordinates maneuver with 1-10 Cav for screening operations between PL Moon and PL Planet.

(6) Forward limit of defensive positions is the BHOL. Defense operations forward of PL Planet requires Brigade approval.

(7) Provide Brigade TAC completed Battalion orders and graphics NLT 21 FEB 99.

(8) Coordinating points are as follows: PL :WL; PL : WL; PL: PL: WL; PL :WL; PL: WL PL : WL.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

Personnel support

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21 FEB 99. (1). MSR for 2nd Brigade is HWY 82, alternate MSR is HWY 90 to effective

(2) BSA located at WL 6007.

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL.

a. Command.

(1) Brigade Main CP located at WL 670069. Future location: TBD.

(2) Brigade TAC located at WL 714103. Future location: TBD.

(3) Brigade Rear CP located at WL 605067. Alternate CP is 1ST FSB Location:
TBD.

b. Signal.

(1) 99-03 (Edition A) in effect.

(2) Red star cluster and red smoke are used for emergency situations only.

Acknowledge

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COL

OFFICIAL:

JASSEY
S3

ANNEXES: A - Task Organization
B - Intelligence


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ANNEX A (Task Organization) TO DESERT THUNDER OPORD 99-01

1ST BDE.

1-8 INF (M)
4-40 AR
4-68 AR
5-29 FA (155 SP) (DS)
B/4-61 ADA (GS)
5TH ENG
B/104TH MI
2 (DECON)/4TH CML CO



2/984TH MP CO
2 FSB



2ND BDE

1-10 INF (M)
1-12 INF (M)
3-68 AR
3-29 FA (155 SP) (DS)
A/4-61 ADA (GS)
4TH ENG BN
A/104TH MI
1 (DECON)/4TH CML CO

1/984TH MP CO
1ST FSB



DISCOM

MSB
704 MAINT BN
4TH FINANCE CO
24TH QM CO
326 MED BN
426 S&T CO

4TH AVN BDE

4TH CMD AVN CO
1-44 ATKHB
1-74 ATKHB
4 ASLT HELO CO

DIVISION TROOPS

1-10 CAV (OPCON)
TF 1-77 ARMOR (OPCON)
4-61 ADA BN (-)
4TH ENG (BDE) (-)
52 ENG BN (CBT) (OPCON)
104TH MI BN (-)
24TH SIG BN
4TH CML CO (-)
984TH MP CO (-)
4TH ID BAND

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ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 99-01

COPY_____OF_____COPIES
4th INFANTRY DIVISION
(MECH)
SONORA, WL 3847I
191300L JUNE 1998

Reference: Map Series, sheets 3847I, 3947IV, 3947I, 4047IV, 3847II, 3947III, 3947II, 4047III, 3846I, 3946IV, 3946I, 4046IV.

Time Zone used throughout the Plan: Local.

1. SITUATION.

- a. **Enemy.** Approximately 24 hrs ago the 16th CAA halted its movement east of the Sonora-Maricopia Border. They have been conducting military exercises to the east of the border. These activities are possibly cover operations for an invasion of Sonora. Current enemy FLOT runs north/south along the Sulphur Springs Valley. Current troop dispositions indicate that the 16th CAA will attack with four mechanized brigades of the two mechanized divisions in the first echelon. Division second echelon forces can reinforce the attack in four to six hours. The 16th CAA is believed to be at 75% strength. The 4th ID (M) is directly opposed by the 30th MID and 36th MID. They will likely attack with four MIBs abreast and a tank brigade in reserve. 4th Aviation Brigade assets will attrit lead echelon forces to approximately 80% before they reach 4th ID (M) elements.
- b. **Friendly.** 4th ID (M) defends in sector from Libby Army Air Field in the south to the Whetstone Mountains in the north to defeat first echelon elements of the 16th CAA to protect the Green Valley oil fields and uranium mines. Limit of advance for reconnaissance elements is PL Comet. O/O prepare to conduct offensive operations to restore the FEBA.
- c. **Attachments/Detachments.** See Annex A.

2. **MISSION.** 104th MI Bn (-) assets conduct intelligence operations NLT 190600L JUN 98 in support of 4th ID (M) operations to defeat first echelon forces of 16th CAA.

3. **EXECUTION.** 104th MI Bn (-) provides SIGINT, MASINT, and HUMINT collection in support of 4th ID (M) operations.

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- a. **Scheme of support.** 104th MI Bn (-) supports 4th ID (M) with a company in each brigade. Priority of effort for collection is locating and tracking reconnaissance elements, tank brigades, fire support units, and division/army command posts.
- b. **Tasks to subordinate units.** A/104th MI Bn is in direct support to 2nd Bde; B/104th MI Bn is in direct support to 1st Bde. Each company is comprised of 1 X TRQ-32, 1 X TLQ-17, 1 X CI team, 1 X GSR platoon.
 - (1) Electronic warfare. Primary mission is to identify and monitor C3I nets. Jamming will not be conducted prior to enemy contact. After enemy contact with 1-10 Cav (by direct or indirect fire), priority of jamming is to regiment/division command and control nets. When 4th Avn Bde is committed, jamming priority shifts to enemy artillery and ADA command and control nets in support of SEAD.
- c. **Multidiscipline counterintelligence.** Priority is force protection. Report terrorist, insurgent, or anti-U.S. activities by the Maricopians.
- d. **Coordinating instructions.**
 - (1) Other intelligence requirements (IR).
 - (2) Intelligence acquisition tasks. Subordinate and attached units report as obtained.
 - General.
 - (a) Activity of enemy rotary and fixed-wing assets.
 - (b) Airborne or air assault activity.
 - (c) Enemy NBC attacks.
 - (d) Level II or III threat activity.
 - 1st Bde
 - (a) Enemy reconnaissance activity and locations.
 - (b) Location and orientation of brigade-size attacks.
 - (c) Commitment of the 36th MID second echelon forces.
 - 2nd Bde
 - (a) Enemy reconnaissance activity and locations.
 - (b) Location and orientation of brigade-size attacks.
 - (c) Commitment of the 36th MID second echelon forces.
 - DIVARTY
 - (a) Enemy firing battery locations.
 - (b) All moving target locations.

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104th MI Bn

- (a) Location of division and brigade command posts.
- (b) Location of 16th CAA second echelon.
- (c) Location of artillery and ADA associated radars.

(3) Measures for handling personnel, documents, and materiel.

- (a) Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, inhabitants, and other persons. Captured battlefield personnel will be held in accordance with the Geneva Convention and delivered in the most expedient manner to the Interrogation Facility located at the BSA.
- (b) Captured documents. All captured documents will be delivered to the Division S2 via the Brigade S2. Foreign document exploitation will be conducted at the Interrogation Facility located at the BSA.
- © Captured materiel. All captured materiel will immediately be turned over to engineers for destruction.

(4) Documents or equipment required. Request and obtain Corps intelligence assets (UAV) and products (imagery) through Division ACE.

(5) Distribution of intelligence products. Division ACE will receive daily intsums through Corps.

4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT.

- a. Service. All routes are controlled two-way routes, with priority of use established by the G4. Ten or more vehicles together constitutes a convoy and requires coordination and clearance through DISCOM.
- b. Support. All classes of supply will be distributed by supply point distribution.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command.

- (1) 104th MI Bn (-) command post located with Division command post.
- (2) DS MI company command posts located with Brigade command posts.

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b. Signal.

(1) SOI in effect.

(2) Red star cluster and red smoke are used for emergency situations only.

Acknowledge

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APPENDICES:

1. Intelligence Mission Analysis.
2. Enemy Ground Order of Battle.
3. Road to War.
4. Area Study.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 99-01

REFERENCES: OPORD 99-1 (DESERT THUNDER)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: LOCAL (L)

1. MISSION. 4th ID (M) defends in sector NLT 230100 JUN 98 to defeat first echelon divisions of the 16th CAA. O/O prepare to conduct counterattacks operations to protect the Green Valley oil fields and uranium mines. O/O prepare to conduct offensive operations to restore the FEBA.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather.

(1) Existing Situation. Weather during the month of June, is usually hot with dry heat warm with occasional rains in the late afternoons: Local Forecast 538-2865.

EENT: 1934 hrs	EECT: 1905 hrs	BMNT: 0518 hrs
Sunrise: 0611 hrs	Sunset: 1840 hrs	Wind Spd: 7-8kts
Moonrise: 1430 hrs	Moonset: 0330 hrs	Direction: SW
AVG Low: 55'	AVG High: 76'	Illumination: 55%

(2) Effects on enemy courses of actions:

(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement except in the low drainage areas of existing washes in and around the Huachuca Mountains.

(b) Easterly winds will degrade effects of enemy employment of NBC.

(c) The line of inter-visibility created by the Cienega Creek will allow enemy forces to approach undetected within friendly max effective weapons range in the Rain Valley Gap.

(3) Effects on friendly courses of actions:

(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement except in the low drainage areas of existing washes in and around the Huachuca Mountains.

(b) Easterly winds will not affects of friendly employment of chemical or nuclear weapons.

(c) The line of inter-visibility created by the Cienega Creek will not allow friendly forces to visually detect enemy forces outside friendly max effective weapons range in the Rain Valley Gap.

b. Terrain.

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(1) Existing situation.

(a) Cover and Concealment.

1. There is no cover or concealment from air assets anywhere within the division zone except where specifically addressed.

2. There is no cover or concealment in 2nd BDE zone between highway 83 and the objective except for the Cienega Creek and the Babocomari River. No significant vegetation exists in the area. The Cienega Creek provides cover and concealment from ground observation and fire greater than 500 meters. Some cover and concealment from indirect or air assets can be found along steep banks within the creek. The Babocomari provides cover and concealment from ground observation and fire from outside of the river. Limited cover and concealment from indirect and air assets are available due to the steep banks. The wadis of the Cienega Creek create a line of inter-visibility approximately 1200 meters from the western gap of the Rain Valley.

3. Cover and concealment in 1st BDE zone is provided by the extensive north/south wadis that exist between highway 83 and PL STAR. East/west fire and observation will be limited within the wadis except when cresting the ridges. North/south cover and concealment is extremely limited due to the long range fields of fire running down the wadis.

4. The only cover and concealment in the Mustang/Whetstone/Rain Valley area is provided by the high ground. The high ground will provide protection from ground observation and fire and will reduce indirect fire weapons capability. Cover and concealment from and for air assets will be provided only when the aircraft are masked by the high ground. Specific examples of this are Mescal Springs Pass (WK5512) and Wire Pass (WK5503).

5. The only cover and concealment between PL STAR and PL MOON is provided by the vegetation of the Babocomari River. The mesquite trees provide excellent cover from wire guided weapons. The trees also provide limited concealment, particularly from ground based observation. The vegetation, irregular terrain, and steep banks along the Babocomari from WL6803 to the San Pedro River create a line of inter-visibility roughly 1km to the east and west of the river and thus provide excellent cover and concealment from all assests.

6. The San Pedro River provides excellent cover and concealment from ground based assets but limited cover from indirect fire. Air assets ability to see and shoot will only be slightly degraded by the banks. The high ground east of the San Pedro does have fields of fire into the San Pedro.

7. The terrain between PL MOON and PL PLANET in 1st BDE zone provides good cover and concealment from north/south observation and fields of fire but little cover and concealment east/west.

8. The Tombstone Hills provide cover and concealment for the same reason as the Mustang/Whetstone Mountains.

9. Only the vegetation between PL MOON and PL PLANET provides any cover or concealment in 1st BDE zone. Wire guided systems will be degraded.

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10. The buildings in Huachuca City, Ft. Huachuca, Sierra Vista, and Tombstone provide some cover from direct fires, indirect fires, and CAS. They also provide excellent concealment.

(b) Observation and Fields of Fire.

1. The high ground east of highway 83 (vicinity WL3213, 3310, 3508, and 3504) provides observation and fields of fire for up to 3 km beyond highway 83 and up to 4km west to the Cienega Creek. Observation and fields of fire will be restricted to 500 meters due to the wadis in the Cienega Creek complex. The high ground to the east of highway 83 in the 1st BDE zone (vic. WK3698, 3695, and 3891) provides observation and fields of fire across highway 83 due to the Canelo Hills. Observation and fields of fire from these positions to the east are only limited by the maximum range of the weapon systems.

2. The high ground (vic. WL3813, 3911, 3907, 3904, WK4298, and 3993) provides unlimited east/west observation and fields of fire along the trails and Highway 82 departing Sonoita (WL3204), and to the ranges positioned along the north to south 35 grid line in the 2nd BDE sector, as well as to the 37 grid line in the 2nd BDE sector. North/south observation and fields of fire in the 1st BDE zone is limited to 500 meters in the Cienega Creek Complex.

3. Hill 5308 (WL4508) provides observation and fields of fire 4km north to Mud Springs (WL4513) and 4km south to Elgin (WL4403). This hill also provides observation and fields of fire 3km west to the Cienega Creek and observation to highway 83. Hill 5308 also provides observation and fields of fire entering Rain Valley and south to the Babocomari River.

4. Bald Hill (WK4596) provides observation and fields of fire 4km north to the Babocomari River and observation to highway 83. The wadis to the west of Bald Hill will prevent fire to approaching forces unless the forces crest the ridges.

5. The high ground (WL5011) provides observation and fields of fire throughout the Rain Valley and to the west, observation and fields of fire are only limited by the maximum range of the weapon system. The western slopes of the Mustang Mountains (vic. WL4807, 4805, and 5001) provide observation and fields of fire to the Cienega Creek to the west. The western slopes of the Whetstone Mountains (vic. WL5410, 5508, and 5700) provide observation and fields of fire throughout the Rain Valley.

6. The eastern slopes of the Mustang and Whetstone Mountains provide observation east to beyond the San Pedro River and fields of fire to the maximum effective range of non-wire guided weapon systems.

7. The terrain in 1st BDE sector from the north/south grid line 47 to the north/south grid line 61 limits east/west observation and fields of fire to 200-300 meters for forces not on the crests of ridge-lines and up to 1000 meters north/south along the wadis.

8. Observation and fields of fire is out to the maximum effective range of non-wire guided weapon systems between PL STAR and PL MOON

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except for the high ground (WL7304) and the eastern end of the Babocomari River.

The vegetation, slopes of banks, and irregular terrain in the vicinity of the Babocomari River restrict observation and fields of fire to less than 200 meters. The high ground (WL7304) will prevent ground level observation and fields of fire north/south or east/west into the San Pedro River.

9. Hill 1392 (WL7700), Bronco Hill (WL8098), and Hill 1353 (WK8195) provide observation west beyond PL STAR and east to PL PLANET and the Tombstone Hills. Fields of fire are out to the maximum effective range of weapon systems.

10. The Tombstone Hills and the high ground east of the San Pedro River provide observation to the Whetstone and Mustang Mountains and east beyond PL PLANET. They also provide observation and fields of fire into the San Pedro River. North/south observation and fields of fire from low ground is limited to less than 500 meters due to the east/west running wadis. East/west observation and fields of fire is up to 1500 meters.

(C) Obstacles.

1. The Canelo Hills are Severely Restricted terrain for all vehicles due to the steep slopes.

2. The Cienega Creek is an obstacle to east/west vehicle movement due to irregular terrain and steep banks. Movement is possible but will be slow.

3. The abandoned railroad running parallel to the Babocomari River will degrade north/south maneuver in some locations because of an existing berm.

4. The Mustang and the Whetstone Mountains will canalize movement through the Rain Valley and the other mobility corridors. The steep banks make movement for vehicles impossible.

5. Huachuca Canyon (WK6095), Sycamore Canyon (WK5393), Manila Canyon (WK4296), Lyle Canyon (WK5175), O'Donnell Canyon (WK4996), and Vaughn Canyon (WK4296) will cross compartmentalize maneuver within the 1st BDE zone from the HIGHWAY 83 to PL STAR.

6. The Huachuca Mountains will stop or disrupt east/west and north/south maneuver.

7. Man-made obstacles of Sierra Vista (WK6791), Ft. Huachuca (WK6091), and Tombstone (WL8809) will divert movement along the roads.

8. The Babocomari River is an obstacle to north/south vehicle movement due to the steep banks and vegetation. The river becomes a greater obstacle as it moves east. Increased vegetation, irregular terrain north and south of the river, fences, and steep & irregular banks make movement across the river impossible; except at established crossing sites.

9. The San Pedro River is an obstacle to east/west vehicle movement due to the steep banks, vegetation, and irregular terrain associated with the river.

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Two sets of banks actually exist along the San Pedro. The river bottom is solid in most places.

10. The Tombstone Hills are an obstacle to vehicle movement due to the steep slopes and irregular terrain.

(d) Key Terrain.

1. Hill 5308 (WL4508) controls movement along Highway 82 entering/exiting the Rain Valley and provides observation to highway 83 and fields of fire west to the Cienega Creek, north to Mud Springs, and south to Elgin. The slopes are gentle enough to allow forces to occupy, this region.

2. Bald Hill (WK4596) controls the 1st BDE approach to objective SUSAN. The hill provides observation and fields of fire 4km north to the Babocomari River and observation of highway 83. The wadis to the west of Bald Hill will prevent fire to approaching forces unless the forces crest the ridge line.

3. Hills 1600 (WL5001) and 1513 (WL5301) control the mobility corridor (2A) running between the Mustang Mountains and the Babocomari River.

4. The Rain Valley is the decisive terrain in the 2nd BDE zone. The force that controls it, wins the battle. Rain Valley provides excellent maneuver and contains Highway 82. The eastern end is especially key because it is the narrowest point (2km) in the valley. Hill 1513 (WK5301) should be considered key for an eastern attack and hilltop vic WK565065 key for a western attack.

5. The fording (WL5900, 6803, and 6904) and bridging (WL6301) sites on the Babocomari River are key because they provide the best north/south movement across the river.

6. The fording (WL7515, 7612, 7706, WK7899, 8194, and 8191) and bridging (WL7709 and WK7899) sites on the San Pedro River are key because they provide the best east/west movement across the river. The bridge at WK7899 is a Class 60 bridge.

(e) Avenues of Approach.

1. FRIENDLY AVENUES OF APPROACH: Two Brigade size avenues of approach exist within the division zone.

AA1- Extends from the Whetstone Mountains south to the Babocomari River. It is approximately 9-10 km wide. The Cienega Creek will slow movement between highway 83 and PL SUN, but there are no significant mobility corridors in these areas. The Mustang and Whetstone Mountains create numerous mobility corridors between PL SUN and PL STAR.

MC1- Runs down the Rain Valley. It is 6km wide at the western end and narrows to 2km at the eastern end. MC1 will provide high speed movement for the enemy along Highway 82 and high speed cross-country mobility off road.

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MC1a- Splits off from MC1 to the north (WL5013) and reenters MC1 at WL5310. MC1a is 2km wide.

MC1b- (WL5512) is approximately 1km wide. It provides movement out of MC1 to the north.

MC1c- (WL4906) is approximately 500 meters wide. It provides movement into MC1 from the east through the Mustang Mountains.

MC1d- is approximately 500 meters wide and provides movement south out of the Mustang Mountains.

MC2- Runs south out of the Mustang Mountains about 2500 meters to the Babocomari River. Movement for enemy will be slow in this area. Very limited cover and concealment exists.

AA1- extends through OBJ WATCH with no significant mobility corridors. The major obstacles are the Mustang and Whetstone Mountains and San Pedro River.

AA2- Extends from the Babocomari River south to the Huachuca Mountains from highway 83 through OBJ SUSAN and then to OBJ CLOCK. It is approximately 10-11km wide. No significant mobility corridors exist, however, movement for enemy will be slow due to severe cross-compartmentalization. The San Pedro River is the major obstacle for the enemy and little cover and concealment will exist.

3. ENEMY AVENUES OF APPROACH.

AA1- Division size avenue of approach, with two regiments abreast, from WL8917 to Highway 83. AA1 runs north of the Tombstone Hills, across the San Pedro River, and then uses the Babocomari river as its northern boundary. Mobility corridors exist within the Whetstone and Mustang Mountains as discussed in Friendly Avenues of Approach above.

AA2- Division size avenue of approach, with two reinforcements abreast, from WL9599 to the Canelo Hills (WK3296).

MC1- (WL9201) is a battalion size MC

MC2- (WL8506) is a high speed, company size MC running down Charleston Road. MC3- (WK9492) is a battalion to regimental size MC.

MC4- (WK9398) is a battalion size MC.

AA2- Must cross the San Pedro River and is bounded on the north by the Babocomari River and on the south by the Huachuca Mountains. Other obstacles include the towns of Sierra Vista, Fort Huachuca, and Huachuca City. There are also severe wadis running north/south throughout this avenue of approach.

AA3- Division size avenue of approach, with two regiments abreast, entering the division area of operations from the south. It is bounded to the east by the San Pedro River and to the west by the Whetstone Mountains. It enters AA1 or can travel south, cross the Babocomari River, and enter AA2.

AA4- Division size avenue of approach, with two regiments abreast, entering the division area of operations from the south. It is bounded to

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the east by the San Pedro River and to the west by the Whetstone Mountains. It enters AA1 or can travel south, cross the Babocomari River, and enter AA2.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Disposition. See Enemy Situation Template.

b. Composition. The 4th ID (M) is directly opposed by the 16th CAA. See Order of Battle Handout, Appendix 2 to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 99-01.

c. Strength. The 16th CAA is currently at 97% strength in personnel and equipment.

(1) Committed Forces. At this stage, two complete mechanized Divisions with all organic and attached equipment and forces.

(2) Reinforcements. The second echelon divisions could reinforce between 24-72 hours, with the possibility of a tank division entering our sector within the same time frame.

(3) Artillery. The enemy has established BAGs and DAGS for the first echelon. At this point there has been no indication of CORP or ARMY artillery groups forming.

(4) Air. Air parity currently exist. The 16th CAA has 45 sorties available daily; these are fixed wing assets (SU 24/25, MIG 21 and 23) from the 27th Tactical Air Army (TAA). Rotary winged assets include the 66th Helicopter Squadrons. The enemy has no night air capability.

(5) NBC. The CAA has chemical delivery capability and possess chemical munitions. Delivery assets available to the 16th CAA include all tubed artillery 120mm and larger, MRL, rotary and fixed wing platforms, an FROG and SCUD missiles. The CAA possess nuclear delivery means, but not the munitions. Delivery means include tubed artillery of 152mm and larger, fixed wing assets and the FROG and SCUD missiles.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities.

Enemy Forces. Elements of the Maricopian 16th CAA have been conducting military exercises to the east of the Sonora-Maricopia Border. There are indications that this activity is a cover for an invasion of Sonora. The 16th CAA will attack with four mechanized brigades of the two mechanized divisions in the first echelon. Divisional second echelon forces can reinforce the attack in four to six hours with a second echelon division in 24 to 48 hours. 4th ID (M) is directly opposed by two Maricopian Mechanized divisions. The Maricopian force could enter the 4th ID (M) sector within 48 to 72 hours. Maricopian Humint teams have been emplaced among Sonorians several weeks ago. Radio traffic to tactical units has increased along the border.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses. NSTR

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

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a. Enumeration.

(1) The 16th CAA can attack within 48 to 72 hours. The 16th CAA can attack with four mechanized brigades of the two mechanized divisions in the first echelon.

(2) The 16th CAA can attack with three mechanized brigades forward on line in the first echelon, followed by a tank brigade in the second echelon ready to exploit any success.

(3) Divisional second echelon forces can reinforce the attack in four to six hours with a second echelon divisions in twelve to eighteen hours.

b. Analysis and Discussion. Because the 16th CAA is conducting counter-mobility and survivability operations, it is expected that they will try to cross both the Sand Pedro and Babocomari rivers. There are no current indicators suggesting the introduction of reinforcements into the division area.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Intelligence. See Annex B.

b. Weather and Terrain. Weather and terrain will not affect the ability of intelligence to accomplish the mission.

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action.

(1) COA 1. A division can attack west to seize the Sierra Vista - Ft. Huachuca (SV - FH) Complex with the follow on mission of seizing the Nogales (XL 0566) area. A brigade attack from vicinity College Peak (XK 5083) through Bisbee Airfield (XK 8883) - Bisbee (XK 037) - Libby Airbase (WK 6394). A second brigade attacks west from vicinity XL 5014 to Tombstone (WL 8808) with the objective of the Rain Valley (WL 5307). Second echelon brigades continue the attack up the Babocomari River to Sonita (WL 3304), turning south to Nogales.

(2) COA 2. A division can attack west to seize the Sierra Vista - Ft. Huachuca (SV - FH) Complex with the follow on mission of seizing the Nogales (XL 0566) area. A brigade attacks west from vicinity XL 5014 to Tombstone (WL 8808) with the objective of the Rain Valley (WL 5307). A second brigade attacks west from vicinity XK 4396 through NcNeal (XK 2596) to WK 9098 to the SV - FH complex. Second echelon brigades continue the attack up the Babocomari River to Sonita (WL 3304), turning south to Nogales.

(3). COA 3. A division attacks west to seize the SV - FH Complex. A brigade attacks from vicinity College Peak (XK 5083) through Douglas (XL 3870) - Bakersville (XK 0576) - Libby Air Base (WK 6394). A brigade attacks from vicinity XK 5070 to Paul Spur (XL 2171 - west to Palominas (WK 8473). At this point the brigade can move south of the Huachuca Mtns to Parker Canyon Lake (WK 5376) or north-west to the SV - FH

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Complex. A division can attack west to seize the Sierra Vista - Ft. Huachuca (SV - FH) Complex with the follow on mission of seizing the Nogales (XL 0566) area. A brigade attacks west from vicinity XL 5014 to Tombstone (WL 8808) with the objective of the Rain Valley (WL 5307). A second brigade attacks west from vicinity XK 4396 through NcNeal (XK 2596) to WK 9098 to the SV - FH complex. Second echelon brigades continue the attack up the Babocomari River to Sonita (WL 3304), turning south to Nogales.

(4) COA 4. A division attacks west to seize the SV - FH Complex. A brigade attacks from vicinity College Peak (XK 5083) through Douglas (XL 3870) - Bakersville (XK 0576) - Libby Air Base (WK 6394). A brigade attacks from vicinity XK 5070 to Paul Spur (XL 2171 - west to Palominas (WK 8473). At this point the brigade can move south of the Huachuca Mtns to Parker Canyon Lake (WK 5376) or north-west to the SV - FH Complex. A division can attack west to seize the Sierra Vista - Ft. Huachuca (SV - FH) Complex with the follow on mission of seizing the Nogales (XL 0566) area. A brigade attacks west from vicinity XL 5014 to Tombstone (WL 8808) with the objective of the Rain Valley (WL 5307). A second brigade attacks west from vicinity XK 4396 through NcNeal (XK 2596) to WK 9098 to the SV - FH complex. Second echelon brigades continue the attack up the Babocomari River to Sonita (WL 3304), turning south to Nogales. When Maricopian forces attacking west on Highway 10 reach Benson (WL 6737), a brigade attacks south on highway 80 to seize the SV - FH complex.

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities. Due to the lack of cover and concealment between the PL PLANET and PL STAR, we should be able to locate the enemy's reconnaissance echelon. High ground in the Whetstone and Mustang Mountains will provide friendly forces excellent observation of enemy movements once units move west out of the San Pedro River Valley. The enemy's line of communications are being significantly interdicted by JTF Deep Attack which will impact on resupply operations.

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**APPENDIX 2 (ENEMY GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to 4th ID (M) OPORD 99-01**

MARCOPIAN ORDER OF BATTLE

WESTERN ARMY GROUP

16 CAA / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
19 CAA / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
29 TA / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
10 TTA / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
27 TAC AIR ARMY / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
67 ARTY DIV / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
 4 GUN BDE (2S7)
 15 GUN BDE (2A65)
 42 HOWITZER BDE (D-20)
 99 HOWITZER BDE (D-30)
 14 MRL BDE (BM-22/9A52)

67 SSM BDE (SCUD) / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
U/I SSM BDE (SCUD) / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
U/I SAM BDE (SA-12) / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
212 SAM BDE (SA-4) / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
48 CHEMICAL DEF BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
19 AT BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
19 ENG BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
670 MRL RGT / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
320 PONTOON RGT / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
U/I RADIO AND RADAR INTERCEPT RGT / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
U/I INTEL RGT / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
6 EARLY WARNING RGT / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
41 ASSAULT BN / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
U/I REC BN / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
323 MAINT BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
71 MOTOR TRANSPORT BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
U/I PIPELINE BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP
120 SIGNAL BDE / WESTERN ARMY GROUP

16 MARCOPIAN ARMY (MA) / WESTERN ARMY GROUP

30 MECH DIV / 16 MA
36 MECH DIV / 16 MA
41 MECH DIV / 16 MA
60 MECH DIV / 16 MA
5 TD / 16 MA

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48 ARTY BDE / 16 MA
U/I ARTY BN (2S5)
CDR: UNK FPN: 52241
18 ARTY BN (2S5)
CDR: MAJ AMBROSE FPN: UNK
U/I ARTY BN (2S5)
CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
U/I ARTY BN (2S5)
CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
47 ARTY BN (2S5)
CDR: UNK FPN: 43523

U/I MRL RGT (BM-22/9P140) FPN: UNK
U/I SSM BDE (SS21)
216 SAM BDE (SA-4)
U/I SAM BDE (SA-11)
161 ENG BDE
U/I MED BN
14 MATERIAL SUPPORT BDE
57 COMBAT HEL RGT
17 AT RGT (MT-12 & MTLB W/AT-6/9P149)
U/I SIGNAL RGT
328 MAINTENANCE BN
U/I SPETSNAZ BN
522 FLAMETHROWER BN
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE BN
12 EARLY WARNING BN

30th MECH DIV / 16th CAA

HHC / 30 MECH DIV
DIV CDR: UNK FPN: 10111
COVER NAME: MAIN RIVER IRON DIVISION

180 MECH BDE

CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
1 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)
2 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)
3 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)
180 TK BN (T-72)
180 ARTY BN (2S1)
180 AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
180 AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)
U/I SIGNAL CO
180 RECON CO
180 ENG CO
180 MEDICAL PLT
180 MATERIAL SPT CO
180 MAINT CO
180 CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

UNCLASSIFIED

U/I MECH BDE

CDR: UNK FPN: 1011B
1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
3 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
TK BN (T-72)
ARTY BN (2S1)
AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)
SIGNAL CO
RECON CO
ENG CO
MEDICAL PLT
MATERIAL SPT CO
MAINT CO
CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

190 MECH BDE

CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
3 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
U/I TK BN (T-72)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)
U/I SIGNAL CO
U/I RECON CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MEDICAL PLT
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I MAINT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

65 TANK BDE

CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
1 BN (T-72)
2 BN (T-72)
3 BN (T-72)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I RECON CO
U/I SIG CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MED CO
U/I MAINT CO
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

15 ARTY RGT

CDR: COL REX FPN: 1011E

UNCLASSIFIED

1 BN (2S3)
2 BN (2S3)
3 BN (2S3)
23 MRL BN (BM-21)

U/I SAM RGT (SA-6)

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

12 AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)

CDR: LTC SCOTT FPN: 10111-3

38 RECON AND EC BN

CDR: U/I FPN: U/I

266 ENG BN

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

U/I SIGNAL BN

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

U/I MATERIAL SPT BN

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

19 MAINT BN

CDR: MAJ WHRENCH FPN: 10111-41

170 MED BN

CDR: UNK FPN: 10111-53

403 CHEMICAL DEFENSE BN

CDR: MAJ SARIN FPN: U/I

36th MECH DIV / 16th CAA

HHC / 36 MECH DIV

DIVISION CDR: LENZNER FPN: U/I

COVERNAME: DEFENDER OF THE MARNE DIVISION

29 MECH BDE

CDR: COL ANDERSON FPN: 13610

1 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)

2 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)

3 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)

U/I TK BN (T-64)

29 ARTY BN (2S1)

U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)

U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)

U/I SIGNAL CO

U/I RECON CO

U/I ENG CO

U/I MEDICAL PLT

U/I MATERIAL SPT CO

U/I MAINT CO

U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

U/I MECH BDE

CDR: UNK FPN: 13620

1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

UNCLASSIFIED

3 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
U/I TK BN (T-64)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)
U/I SIGNAL CO
U/I RECON CO
27 ENG CO
U/I MEDICAL PLT
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I MAINT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

53 MECH BDE

CDR: COL WALKER FPN: U/I
1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
3 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
U/I TK BN (T-64)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)
U/I SIGNAL CO
U/I RECON CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MEDICAL PLT
53 MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I MAINT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

U/I TANK BDE

CDR: COL KUMMER FPN: 13630
1 BN (T-64)
2 BN (T-64)
3 BN (T-64)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I RECON CO
U/I SIG CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MED CO
U/I MAINT CO
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

11 ARTY RGT

CDR: LTC CORNISH FPN: 13670
1 BN (2S3)
2 BN (2S3)
3 BN (2S3)
U/I MRL BN (BM-21)

UNCLASSIFIED

U/I SAM RGT (SA-8)
CDR: LTC GRAY FPN: U/I
U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT5/9P148 & MT-12)
CDR: MAJ HAUSER FPN: 13601
34 RECON & EC BN
CDR: UNK FPN: U/I
230 ENG BN
CDR: LTC KRUPPEN FPN: U/I
57 SIGNAL BN
CDR: MAJ PLYMALE FPN: U/I
U/I MATERIAL SPT BN
CDR: LTC PROSSER FPN: U/I
U/I MAINT BN
CDR: MAJ BAILEY FPN: 13608
U/I MED BN
CDR: LTC LAMONT FPN: U/I
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE BN
CDR: MAJ SOMAN FPN: U/I

41 MECH DIV/16 CAA**

HHC / 41 MECH DIV
DIVISION CDR: UNK FPN: 67000
COVER NAME: PARIS-METZ ORDER OF THE LION BANNER DIVISION

127 MECH BDE(BTR-70\T-64)
U/I MECH BDE(BMP-1\T-64)
148 MECH BDE(BMP-1\T-64)
199 TANK BDE(T-64B)
85 ARTY RGT (2S3)
U/I MRL BN
109 SAM RGT (SA-8)
61 AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)
176 RECON & EC BN
416 SIG BN
U/I ENG BN
1022 MAINT BN
U/I MAT SPT BN
U/I MED BN
175 CHEMICAL DEFENSE BN

** SUB-UNITS ORGANIZED SAME AS 30TH MECH DIV

60 MECH DIV/16 CAA

HHC / 60TH MECH DIV
DIVISION CDR: BG HARDMAN FPN: U/I
COVER NAME: FREZENA ORDER OF THE EAGLE DIVISION

UNCLASSIFIED

U/I MECH BDE(BTR-70)

CDR: UNK

FPN: 36010

1 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)

2 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)

3 MECH INF BN (BTR-70)

U/I TK BN (T-72)

U/I ARTY BN (2S1)

U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)

U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)

U/I SIGNAL CO

U/I RECON CO

U/I ENG CO

39 MEDICAL PLT

U/I MATERIAL SPT CO

U/I MAINT CO

U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

44 MECH BDE(BMP-1)

CDR: COL SCHMECH INFDT

FPN: U/I

1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

3 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

44 TK BN (T-72)

U/I ARTY BN (2S1)

U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)

U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 AND MT-12)

U/I SIGNAL CO

44 RECON CO

U/I ENG CO

U/I MEDICAL PLT

U/I MATERIAL SPT CO

U/I MAINT CO

U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

U/I MECH BDE(BMP-1)

CDR: COL VEDRAL

FPN: U/I

1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

3 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)

U/I TK BN (T-72)

U/I ARTY BN (2S1)

U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)

U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)

U/I SIGNAL CO

U/I RECON CO

U/I ENG CO

U/I MEDICAL PLT

U/I MATERIAL SPT CO

U/I MAINT CO

U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

UNCLASSIFIED

181 TANK BDE(T-72)

CDR: UNK FPN: 36040

1 BN (T-72)

2 BN (T-72)

3 BN (T-72)

181 ARTY BN (2S1)

181 AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)

181 RECON CO

181 SIG CO

181 ENG CO

181 MED PLT

181 MAINT CO

181 MATERIAL SPT CO

181 CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

ARTY RGT (2S3)

CDR: UNK FPN: 36070

1 BN (2S3)

2 BN (2S3)

3 BN (2S3)

17 MRL BN

122 SAM RGT (SA-6)

CDR: LTC HANSON FPN: U/I

36 RECON & EC BN

CDR: MAJ ZENYUK FPN: U/I

29 AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)

CDR: LTC KING FPN: 36100-5

U/I SIG BN

CDR: MAJ REDELL FPN: U/I

15 ENG BN

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

U/I MAINT BN

CDR: MAJ LOPEZ FPN: 36100-7

U/I MAT SPT BN

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

U/I MED BN

CDR: UNK FPN: 36100-8

U/I CHEM DEFENSE BN

CDR: LTC H. C. SMOKE FPN: U/I

5th Tank Division/ 16 CAA

HHC / 5TH TD

DIVISION CDR: MG PANZER FPN: 15000

COVER NAME: ORDER OF THE GOLDEN CROSS DIVISION

10 TANK BDE(T-72)

CDR: UNK FPN: 15010

1 BN (T-72)

2 BN (T-72)

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3 BN (T-72)
U/I MECH INF BN (BMP-2)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I RECON CO (BMP-2 & BRDM-2)
U/I SIG CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MED PLT
U/I MAINT CO
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

15 TANK BDE(T-72)

CDR: UNK FPN: U/I

1 BN (T-72)
2 BN (T-72)
3 BN (T-72)
U/I MECH INF BN (BMP-2)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I RECON CO (BMP-2 & BRDM-2)
U/I SIG CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MED PLT
15 MAINT CO
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

U/I TANK BDE(T-72)

CDR: COL MANSTEIN FPN: UNK

1 BN (T-72)
2 BN (T-72)
3 BN (T-72)
U/I MECH INF BN (BMP-2)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I RECON CO (BMP-2 & BRDM-2)
U/I SIG CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MED PLT
U/I MAINT CO
U/I MATERIAL SPT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

75 MECH BDE(BMP-1)

CDR: COL v. LUCK FPN: 15075

1 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
2 MECH INF BN (BMP-1)
U/I TK BN (T-72)
U/I ARTY BN (2S1)
U/I AD BTRY (ZSU-23/4 & SA-13)
U/I AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12)

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U/I SIGNAL CO
U/I RECON CO
U/I ENG CO
U/I MEDICAL PLT
U/I MAINT SPT CO
U/I MAINT CO
U/I CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLT

27 ARTY RGT (2S3)

CDR: UNK FPN: 15027
1 BN (2S3)
2 BN (2S3)
18 MRL BN

151 SAM RGT (SA-8)

CDR: LTC RAPIER FPN: UNK
305 RECON & EC BN
CDR: MAJ KAVELIR FPN: 15100-3
51 AT BN (BRDM-2 AT-5/9P148 & MT-12
CDR: UNK FPN: 15100-5
14 SIG BN
CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
U/I ENG BN
CDR: UNK FPN: 15100-4
15 MAINT BN
CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
315 MAT SPT BN
CDR: LTC FELIX FPN: 15100-6
5 MED BN
CDR: UNK FPN: UNK
5 CHEMICAL DEFENSE BN
CDR: LTC POSGENE FPN: 15100-9

27 TACTICAL AIR ARMY

127 FIGHTER DIVISION

50 FIGHTER RGT (MIG-23 = 45 AIRCRAFT)
51 FIGHTER RGT (MIG-23 = 45 AIRCRAFT)
52 FIGHTER RGT (MIG-21 = 45 AIRCRAFT)

67 FIGHTER-BOMBER DIVISION

12 FIGHTER-BOMBER RGT (SU-25 = 45 AIRCRAFT)
13 FIGHTER-BOMBER RGT (SU-25 = 45 AIRCRAFT)
14 FIGHTER-BOMBER RGT (SU-25 = 45 AIRCRAFT)

69 FIGHTER-BOMBER DIVISION

71 FIGHTER-BOMBER RGT (SU-25 = 45 AIRCRAFT)

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72 FIGHTER-BOMBER RGT (SU-25 = 45 AIRCRAFT)
73 FIGHTER-BOMBER RGT (SU-25 = 45 AIRCRAFT)

23 IND. RECON RGT

41 RECON SQDN (MIG-25)
42 RECON SQDN (MIG-25)
43 RECON SQDN (MIG-25)

66 HELICOPTER REGIMENT (TRANS)

91 HEAVY-LIFT SQDN (MI-6 = 12 HELO)
92 HEAVY-LIFT SQDN (MI-6 = 12 HELO)
93 MEDIUM-LIFT SQDN (MI-8t = 16 HELO)
94 MEDIUM-LIFT SQDN (MI-8t = 16 HELO)

57 COMBAT HELO RGT

12 ATTACK HELICOPTER SQDN (MI-24D = 20 HELO)
14 ATTACK HELICOPTER SQDN (MI-24D = 20 HELO)
20 MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTER SQDN (MI-8t = 20 HELO)

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ROAD TO WAR

In 1937, the President of Maricopia sold what is now the Province of Cochise to the country of Sonora. This sale was caused by a shortage of cash brought about by Maricopia's war with Nouveau Orleans over shipping rights on the Mississippi River.

In 1953, oil was discovered in the Green Valley area (WA 0024). Proven reserves are over a trillion barrels of light crude. In 1965, high grade uranium was discovered on the western slopes of the Sierrita Mountains (VA 7525) and there are indications of high grade ores vicinity Mildred Peak (VA 4306) in the Baboquivari Mountains to the west.

In 1970, the Maricopian government was overthrown by a military dictatorship. In order to remain in power, General Animas gave the military pay raises, perks and began buying military equipment from the Soviet Union. These expenditures slowly drove Maricopia into deepening debt.

In 1977 major deposits of iridium were found in the hills to the west and south of the town of Tombstone (WL 8809). The deposits were quickly identified as the largest and purest outside of those controlled by the Krasnovians. Large numbers of Sonorans from the Phoenix area moved into the area to support the mining boom. The local citizens of Maricopian descent felt cheated as they did not share in the growth of Tombstone as the town became the mining support center for the new mining industry. The newly arrived Sonorans did not help matters as when they outnumbered the Maricopians they quickly elected their own city council and voted in their own laws, often to the detriment of the local citizens. Tension from the Sonorans and Maricopians remains high.

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In 1985 General Simon overthrew General Animas who fled the country taking what was left of the national treasury with him. In order to continue military pay and weapons purchases, General Simon signed treaties with Krasnovia in exchange for loans and military credits. General Simon also began denouncing the 1937 sale of Cochise Province to Sonora.

In 1988, the United States and Sonora signed a military treaty. This treaty called for the U.S. to train Sonoran military units, provide military credits for equipment, allowed for U.S. Army units to train in Sonora and forward base heavy equipment to equip a mechanized division in the Tucson area.

In 1990, General Simon began hinting that Cochise should be returned to Maricopia. He also began supporting a group of Maricopian expatriates who had left Cochise for various reasons.

These expatriates were provided with weapons and training and were organized and trained in the Lordsburg area (YL 1582). It was thought that this unit is approximately brigade sized. The unit appeared to be armed with light weapons and maybe motorized.

Also in 1990, low level border incursions began along the Sonoran-Maricopian Border. The Maricopian leadership stated that these incursions were by bandits and disaffected people of Cochise. The arms and equipment used were of types known to be used by the Maricopian army.

In 1993, disaffected citizens of Cochise began a campaign to split Cochise from Sonora. While not proven, there are strong indications that this effort is supported from Maricopia. An insurgent group, the Sonoran Peoples Army (SPA) terrorist group, has grown out of this movement and has conducted attacks against the oil facilities in Green Valley and in the Province capital of Tucson.

In January 1995, General Simon's speeches began to demand that Cochise be returned to Maricopia. He claimed that the sale had been illegal and because of this, the province should be returned to Maricopia.

In February 1995, the Cochise Liberation Brigade (CLB) conducted an attack into Cochise Province. It has been identified as a motorized infantry brigade with three infantry battalions and some combat support elements. The Cochise Liberation Bde crossed into Cochise near XK 5069 and attacked along Highway 80, seizing the towns of Douglas (XK 3769), Bisbee (XK 0378) and Tombstone (WL 8808). The CLB Commander expected an uprising by disaffected Maricopian peoples in Cochise in support of the invasion. But this did not occur. Brigade operations in

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the Bisbee area were extremely harsh with looting, general attacks on the citizens and arson of much of the town. This was probably due to the high proportion of loyal Sonorans in the town.

The Sonoran 1st Infantry Division, garrisoned in the Ft Huachuca area was given the mission of destroying or forcing the Cochise Liberation Bde out of the province. President Manos, the leader of Sonora, also requested U.S. aid in destroying this threat. The 2d Bde, 11 Airborne Division was dispatched to Tucson Airport and forward based in Libby Air Base (WK 6394). The 2d Bde attacked to destroy the CLB's Motorized Bn in the Tombstone area. These operations were conducted successfully, receiving the thanks of the Sonoran nation. The 1st Infantry Division was able to successfully carry out operations against the remainder of the CLB and destroyed much of them. Remnants of the CLB withdrew back into Maricopia.

After the CLB incursion, the Sonoran government requested equipment upgrades and training from the U.S. The U.S. provided enough heavy equipment to mechanize the Sonoran 1st Inf Div. Major equipment sent to Sonora included M-60A5 tanks, a mix of M-2 Bradleys and M-113 APC's and M-109 SP 155mm howitzers. A training team and maintenance assistance team was included with the equipment to train the Sonorans in the use and upkeep of the new equipment.

President Manos also requested that the U.S. maintain a military presence in the Ft Huachuca/Libby area. In response, the U.S. rotates an airborne infantry battalion combat team to the airbase for desert warfare exercises and the U.S. Air Force rotates an A-10, F-15 or F-16 Squadron through Libby Air Base on a quarterly basis on training missions and to use the bombing range at Wilcox Lake. The Air Force also maintains a transportation unit on the base to service weekly MAC flights. The U.S. was also authorized to preposition a division's heavy equipment and ammunition in near Phoenix. This equipment was to be used for training at Sonoran desert training sites.

HEAVY BDE

In July 1995, Maricopian General Simon threatened to take back Cochise by force. To reinforce this threat, Maricopian military units of up to division size began to conduct exercises just east of the Sonoran-Maricopian border. The number of border incursions also began to rise and there are also indications that Maricopian special forces units are conducting reconnaissance of mountain areas along the border.

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In February 1996, General Simon announced a major mobilization exercise to be followed by a nation wide series of exercises. U.S. intelligence sources have noted at least three divisions of the Maricopian 16th CAA conducting military exercises in the Lordsburg area.

In late February 1996 two brigades of the U.S. 4th Inf Div (M) were air lifted to Tucson to carry out joint exercises in Casa Grande area to the north west of Tucson. These exercises are expected to last approximately 30 days.

SASO

On 16 March 1996 Maricopian military units crossed the border into Sonora. Initial successes allowed Maricopian forces to seize eastern Cochise Province up to a line from Sierra Vista through Benson before the invasion was halted in late March by joint U.S./Sonoran combat operations. In mid-April, a coalition of U.S., Sonoran and other forces began a counterattack. The counterattack caused heavy Maricopian material and personnel losses which in-turn brought about a coup against General Simon. A Junta of army officers and conservative civilian leaders took over the government and requested peace talks. By July 1996 all Maricopian military units were back within their borders. In the peace treaty, the Maricopians renounced any claims to the Province of Cochise.

In September 1996, with the return of Sonoran forces to eastern Cochise Province, the plight of ethnic Maricopians worsened because of their support of the invasion. Ethnic Maricopians even suspected of supporting the invasion were heavily fined. Others were deported from the province to areas dominated by ethnic Sonorans. Over 10% of the ethnic Maricopians population of Cochise was deported. Their property was seized and sold to ethnic Sonorans. Human Rights groups claimed the government was conducting ethnic cleansing of the province. The Sonoran government called for a confidence vote within the province and claimed the results showed overwhelming support for the government's position. There were charges of voter fraud to include ballot box stuffing, ethnic Maricopinas not being allowed to vote and voting by ethnic Sonorans from outside the province.


In March 1997 the Sonoran People's Army (SPA) began a major recruiting campaign. The SPA leadership apparently decided that only the ethnic Maricopians could free themselves from the Sonorans. Recruits were organized into armed and support personnel and the insurgency against the government which had been at extremely low levels since before the March 1996

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invasion, blazed up again. Reporting suggests that some of the arms used came from caches left by withdrawing Maricopian troops in eastern Cochise while other arms are being smuggled into the province from Mexico to the south.

In August 19XX President Chato, who was elected to office after President Manos requested U.S. aid in defeating the ongoing insurgency. U.S. Special Forces and PSYOPS personnel were deployed to the Sierra Vista/Libby AB area to aid in the counter-insurgency program. This was later reinforced with a light infantry battalion to provide security for Libby Air Base.

COCHISE PROVINCE: AREA STUDY



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BY: 417h MI Det

(Strategic)

Dec 96

1. General. Cochise Province is the south eastern most province in the country of SONORA. It is bordered to the east by Maricopia and to the south by MEXICO. The capital of Cochise Province is Tucson, which is found in the north west corner of the province. The country is mostly arid but so called "sky islands" which are mountainous areas with limited amounts of water and well forested areas dot the province. The province's flat arid ground is vegetated with a mix of mesquite bushes, cactus, yucca with some cottonwood trees that are found along river and stream banks. Higher hills may be vegetated with low growing evergreens and scrub oak trees.

2. History.

a. Prior to the arrival of Europeans in the 1550's the province was home to wandering bands of indigenous people that based in the "sky islands" moving with the seasons in a hunter-gather life style. Because the land provided little to sustain a population, these groups raided other tribes for food and plunder. This life style produced very efficient warriors with no compunction about taking from others to fulfill their needs. These people were called Apaches by the Europeans who arrived later.

b. French explorers arrived in the area in 1556 and claimed the San Pedro River valley for France. These explorers came in search of mineral wealth, but found little. A few French settled in the San Pedro and Gila Valleys, attempting to ranch but were killed or driven off by the Apaches by 1610. French traders passed through the area in-route to Spanish held lands to the west until approximately 1715 when French troops established military installations at what is now Wilcox, Bisbee and Sierra Vista. Low level fighting between troops and the Apache warriors continued until 1850 when the Apaches were finally defeated. Those not deported to the Bosque Redondo Reservation in western Maricopia escaped into Mexico. During this period settlers again ranched in the San Pedro and Gila River Valleys.

c. Cochise Province remained a Maricopian backwater with little government interest other than the trade routes to the west until 1937 when the province was sold to Sonora. The

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Maricopian government sold the province to pay off war debts caused by a war between Maricopia and Newbamma over control of the Mississippi River, the border between the two countries. At this time, Sonorans of Spanish descent moved into the province as governmental administrators, border control agents and manning the military posts at Wilcox, Bisbee and Sierra Vista. In addition, some Sonorans began moving into western Cochise Province into the Green Valley area and the Province capital at Tucson. Governmental interest was low due to the arid character of the area.

d. In 1953, oil was discovered in Green Valley and large numbers of ethnic Sonorans began to move into the area to build up the oil industry. In 1965, uranium was discovered on the western slopes of the Sierrita mountains which caused the immigration of even larger numbers of Sonorans. Citizens of Maricopian descent living in the area were often displaced by the Sonorans and a growing ethnic Maricopian bitterness became evident. In 1977 high grade iridium was found in the hills west and south of Tombstone which drew large number of Sonoran miners and administrators to the area. Again, large numbers of ethnic Maricopians were displaced and those that stayed did not prosper in the new period of economic growth caused by the new industry.

e. In 1990, General Simon began hinting that Cochise should be returned to Maricopia. He also began supporting a group of Maricopian expatriates who had left Cochise for various reasons. These expatriates were provided with weapons and training and were organized and trained in the Lordsburg area (YL 1582). It was thought that this unit was approximately brigade sized. The unit appeared to be armed with light weapons and maybe motorized. Also in 1990, low level border incursions began along the Sonoran-Maricopian Border. The Maricopian leadership stated that these incursions were by bandits and disaffected people of Cochise. The arms and equipment used were of types known to be used by the Maricopian army. In 1993, disaffected citizens of Cochise began a campaign to split Cochise from Sonora. While not proven, there are strong indications that this effort is supported from Maricopia. An insurgent group, the Sonoran Peoples Army (SPA) terrorist group, has grown out of this movement and has conducted attacks against the oil facilities in Green Valley and in the Province capital of Tucson. In January 1995, General Simon's speeches began to demand that Cochise be returned to Maricopia. He claimed that the sale had been illegal and because of this, the province should be returned to Maricopia. February 1995, the Cochise Liberation Brigade (CLB) conducted an attack into Cochise Province. It has been identified as a motorized infantry brigade with three infantry battalions and some combat support elements. The Cochise

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Liberation Bde crossed into Cochise and attacked along Highway 80, seizing the towns of Douglas, Bisbee and Tombstone. The CLB Commander expected an uprising by disaffected Maricopian peoples in Cochise in support of the invasion. But this did not occur. Brigade operations in the Bisbee area were extremely harsh with looting, general attacks on the citizens and arson of much of the town. This was probably due to the high proportion of loyal Sonorans in the town.

3. Government.

a. Sonora is a democratic government based on a constitution adopted in 1947. While the Sonoran Constitution is in many ways like the United States Constitution, there fewer constitutional freedoms. While all citizens have the right to vote, the ethnic Sonorans control all facets of the government. The Parliament consists of two houses, an upper house for which Hapts are elected to serve for six years and a lower house where Soods are elected for three years. Some Maricopians have been elected to the lower house of Parliament but they are few and have little impact on the actual conduct of governmental business.

b. Sonora is governed by a popularly elected president who governs for six years and who cannot by law, run for reelection. There is no elected vice president, so by law, the speaker of the upper house of Parliament becomes the president if the sitting president is killed or other wise incapacitated. Sonora's capital is found in Las Vegas in the Province of Nevada.

c. Cochise Province is made up of four prefectures. They are Baboquivari (which contains the Province capital of Tucson), Santi Cruz, Chiricahua and Pima. Each prefecture elects five deputies which sit on the province level Senate and provide province level government. Approximately half of the Senate is made up of ethnic Maricopians but the most powerful leadership positions are held by ethnic Sonorans. Each prefecture has a local government with a member elected for each five percent of the population. Election districts are redrawn every 15 years based on population. The redistricting in 1990 saw new boundaries drawn to provide the ethnic Sonorans as many seats as possible based on Sonoran voter density.

4. Military.


a. Army. A mechanized infantry division is stationed in Cochise Province. This division is equipped with older U.S. equipment with the tanks being M-60A5 variants, the APC's being

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M-113's and a mix of M-109A1 self-propelled 155mm howitzers and M-198 towed 155mm howitzers assigned in the fire support role. Two brigades of the division plus the headquarters and support elements are garrisoned in Tucson. The 5th Brigade is stationed further east with a mechanized battalion garrisoned in Wilcox while the brigade headquarters, a mech and a tank battalion, and support elements are garrisoned at Ft. Huachuca outside Sierra Vista. Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are professionals with the majority of private soldiers being drafted for a period of three years. See Figure 1 for organization of 1 ID (M)

b. Air Force. The air force is equipped with a mix of older U.S. and French aircraft. Two air bases are located in Cochise Province. One (Tucson AB) south east of Tucson and a second (Libby AB) on the outskirts of Sierra Vista. The Tucson Air Base is equipped to host and maintain up to three squadrons at once and is used for training during the winter by squadrons from farther north. Libby Air Base is equipped to host and maintain a squadron of fighter aircraft at a time. The U.S. Air Force has basing rights to Libby AB and regularly rotates fighter or fighter/bomber squadrons through Libby AB for training. In support of this activity, a small Air Force contingent is permanently assigned to Libby AB.

c. Paramilitary. In 1996 the border patrol which is armed with light infantry weapons numbered approximately 7,000 in the province. Their mission is to secure the borders with Maricopia and Mexico.



5. Land and Climate.

a. Cochise Province covers approximately 14,000 square kilometers. At it's widest point it is approximately 147 kilometers wide on an east - west axis and is approximately 113 kilometers long on the north - south axis. The highest point is Mt Grahm at 10,717 feet (3297 meters) and the lowest point is located in Marana with an elevation of 2055 feet (632 meters).

b. There are two wet seasons in Cochise Province. The first occurs during the summer monsoon which occurs in July through early September and the second, during the winter months of January and February. During the summer monsoon period, rain falls during thunder storms which are often short and sharp and will cause flooding of arroyos leading from the higher ground. Thunder storms also are dangerous due to lightning which is very prevalent. During the winter, rains fall slower and flooding is much less prevalent. Temperatures range from -40 degrees in the mountains during the winters to 110 degrees around Tucson during the summer.

6. Transportation and Telecommunications.

a. Cochise Province is served by two major highways. Highway 10, a divided, four lane highway crosses into the province from Maricopia west of Lordsburg, runs west to Tucson and turns northwest to Marana and leaves the province enroute to Phoenix, the capital of Yavapai Province. Highway 19, a divided, four lane highway runs south from Tucson to the border with Mexico running through Green Valley. The province is served by other paved secondary roads and graded unpaved roads. The majority of the paved roads run along the lower, more even ground and are often overlooked by higher ground.

b. A double track rail line runs east - west parallel to Highway 10 while a single track rail line runs south along Highway 19. A single track rail spur also runs south from Benson down the San Pedro Valley to Bisbee and into Mexico.

c. Telephone service is wide spread and very efficient throughout the province. Satellite ground stations are located in Tucson and at Libby AB outside Sierra Vista. AM and FM radio stations are located in Tucson, Sierra Visa and Wilcox. Three television stations originate in Tucson, but service in the eastern portion of the province is limited due to range and terrain.

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7. Natural Resources.

a. Water is highly important to Cochise Province as it is an arid region, with a growing population. In addition to water pumped from an underground aquifer, Tucson is served by an aqueduct which runs east from the Colorado River. The other rivers in the province are seasonal, filling with rain during the monsoon or winter rainy seasons.

b. Mining plays a major part in the economy of Cochise Province. Major deposits of high grade oil, uranium and iridium have been identified and are being mined in the province. Smaller deposits of gold, silver and lead are also mined.

c. Agriculture and farming are secondary income producers. Ranching and cattle raising continues in areas with no mining activity except where cash crops are grown. Due to the low levels of rainfall, cattle require large amounts of land for feed. In some valley areas, such as the Sulpher Springs Valley west of Tombstone, hay fields are irrigated and the crop is exported to ranches throughout the province. Cotton is also grown under irrigation in areas to the west of Tucson providing a cash crop in this otherwise arid area.

8. Population.

a. The population of Cochise Province was estimated at 1.2 million during the 1995 census with the majority living in the Tucson region.

b. Ethnic Groups. Individuals of Maricopian extraction make up approximately 55% of the population with the largest numbers found in Tucson and the eastern portion of the province.

Citizens of Sonoran extraction make up approximately 40% of the population and are centered in the urban areas of Tucson, Tombstone, Bisbee and Wilcox. Large numbers of Sonorans are also located in the Green Valley region conducting mining operations.

Approximately 5% of the population are descendent from the original Apache tribes of the region living in small groups around ranches with jobs associated the cattle business.

c. Languages: French for the Maricopian ethnics and Spanish for the Sonoran ethnics.

d. Religion: 99% Roman Catholic

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e. Education and Literacy: While education is compulsory for children from ages six to 16, school is taught in Spanish. Many children of Maricopian extraction do not learn Spanish until they reach school age and are disadvantaged. Eighty percent of the population is estimated to be literate with the lowest rate in the eastern portion of the province. The University of Sonora has a branch in Tucson which provides a secondary education in many subjects. For advanced degrees, students must travel to Universities in Phoenix or Las Vegas. Junior college type schools with associated technical schools are located in Sierra Vista and Douglas.

9. Other Characteristics.

a. Crime: Low levels of crime are found throughout the province with the majority consisting of ethnic Maricopians stealing from ethnic Sonorans. Of greater concern is the smuggling of illegal drugs north from Mexico. The broken terrain along the border hinders effective border control and both marijuana and cocaine moves in large amounts north for consumption in Phoenix and Las Vegas. Some so called "tar heroin" has also been noted in seizures of illegal drugs along the border. Not all the drugs smuggled into Cochise are destined for Sonoran consumption as some continues to move north and west into the countries in the Pacific northwest of the continent.

The large amounts of money to be found in the illegal drug industry has had some impact on the locals. Bribery is a fact of life in some local law enforcement organizations and several prefecture level judges have been jailed for accepting illegal drug associated bribes.

b. Health Care: Low level health care is good throughout the province. Hospitals are located in Tucson and Sierra Vista. Clinics are located in all major towns and villages and refer patients to the hospitals. The problem is cost. The higher salaries of the ethnic Sonorans allow them to take full advantage of the health care system. The ethnic Maricopians on the other hand are often unable to afford care that cannot be handled at the clinic level. Time required to go to the hospitals and language barriers are other factors which impact on the level of care to ethnic Maricopians. Limited numbers of ethnic Maricopians have graduated from medical schools but most often they work in larger hospitals far from the province or move to Maricopia.

c. Province - National Relations: While national attention to Cochise Province has increased since the discovery and mining

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of minerals has begun, the national government has not returned tax money from these activities to the province. What tax revenues that do return to the province are used to better areas with higher populations of ethnic Sonorans. Support for the mainly Maricopian eastern portion of the state remains low except for the towns of Bisbee, Sierra Vista and Douglas which have higher numbers of ethnic Sonorans due to the mines. The ethnic Maricopian has often not seen the results of a better economy in the province. In many cases, ethnic Maricopians that gain a higher education or become wealthy leave the province for the more affluent western cities or move to Maricopia where their skills or money are in high demand.